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a b s t r a c t
In this paper we question the theoretical tenability of Hertwig, Benz, and Krauss’s (2008)
(HBK) argument that responses commonly taken as manifestations of the conjunction fal-
lacy should be instead considered as reflecting ‘‘reasonable pragmatic and semantic infer-
ences’’ because the meaning of and does not always coincide with that of the logical
operator ^. We also question the relevance of the experimental evidence that HBK provide
in support of their argument as well as their account of the pertinent literature. Finally, we
report two novel experiments in which we employed HBK’s procedure to control for the
interpretation of and. The results obtained overtly contradict HBK’s data and claims. We
conclude with a discussion on the alleged feebleness of the conjunction fallacy, and suggest
directions that future research on this topic might pursue.
! 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Since the early Eighties, about a hundred scientific pa-
pers on the conjunction fallacy (CF) have been published.
Such wide interest is easy to understand, as the CF has be-
come a key topic in the fervent debate on human rational-
ity. Indeed, from the very beginning the CF phenomenon
has been described as a violation of ‘‘the simplest and the
most basic qualitative law of probability’’ (Tversky & Kahn-
eman, 1983, p. 293; but already mentioned in Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982, p. 90). The law at issue is the conjunction
rule, a principle whose compelling nature appears
unequivocal when stated formally: Pr(p ^ q) 6 Pr(p), i.e.,
the joint occurrence of a pair of events (p and q) cannot
be more probable than the occurrence of anyone of them
(e.g., p).
In contrast, what does seem surprising across more
than 30 years of research is the recurrence of questions
about the validity of CF experiments. A standard line of
argument inspired by the pragmatics of communication
has been that violation of the conjunction rule need not
be irrational if it results from interpreting the experimental
task in ways that rob it of normative relevance. The main
sources of misinterpretation considered in the literature
include participants’ understanding of the isolated con-
junct p, the term probable, and the connective and. Many
techniques have been developed to control for each of
these possible misinterpretations (see Moro, 2009, for a re-
cent review), but none of them has dissipated the effect.
Nonetheless some concerns turned out to be important
and should be credited for having fostered improvements
in the experimental procedures by which the CF is investi-
gated. To illustrate, the suspicion that the single conjunct p
might be interpreted as p-and-not-q (Adler, 1984; Dulany
& Hilton, 1991; Messer & Griggs, 1993; Morier & Borgida,
1984; Polizer & Noveck, 1991; but already discussed in
Tversky and Kahneman, 1982, 1983) led to more careful
control of stimuli, such as explicitly including the state-
ment p-and-not-q in the judgment task along with p and
p-and-q. When this technique is applied (as in Tentori,
Bonini, & Osherson, 2004; Wedell & Moro, 2008), the rate
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